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 Timing attack is the type of side-channel attack involves the time taken to 
complete critical operations. Securing crypto processor from timing attack is 
critical issue. This paper implements the Bernstein’s Timing Attack and 
timing attack based on hamming weight. The countermeasures of Bernstein’s 
Timing attack are implemented in our experimental test bed and their 
performance is compared. This paper also proposes the key recovery method 
based on timing attack using hamming weight of the key. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The use of computers and communication systems increases the need for securing the information 
kept in devices or sent between them. In real world all the sensitive information is controlled and distributed 
via computer networks. Cryptographic algorithms protect the information by protecting cryptographic keys 
but there are still many issues for systems in which the physical implementations can be accessed. Today, 
cryptographic algorithms are increasingly applied or embedded in devices such as smart cards and cell 
phones. Attackers can retrieve key using the timing measurements when a cryptographic algorithm is being 
implemented in any of the emebedded systems. This paper proposes the countermeasures for Bernstein’s 
Timing Attack and proposes the efficient countermeasure that can be implemented in any embedded systems 
against timing analysis attack. This paper also gives the timing analysis attack using hamming weight and 
proposes the key recovery algorithm. 
 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT TOPICS 
This section covers the necessary topics required to develop and explain the proposed 
countermeasures and algorithm. 
  
2.1. Implementation Attacks 
Implementation attacks are a type of cryptanalysis attacks that do not target cryptographic 
algorithms and protocols directly. These attacks rather aim at implementations of cryptographic systems (e.g. 
smart cards) to gain knowledge about secret information. These attacks can be Active attacks, which target 
the physical security of the device. Another class of attacks acts in a passive way, just by observing the 
inherent leakage of the cryptographic device.  
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Figure 1. Classification of Implementation Attacks. 
 
 
Passive Attacks are even more dangerous as they do not leave any damage to the cryptographic 
device that can be recognized later on. Passive Attacks just use the cryptographic device in its intended 
environment and can obtain cryptographic keys by leaked information. Side Channel Attacks can retrieve the 
secret information (key) inside those devices by collecting and analyzing the leakage information from side 
channels. Classification of implementation attacks are shown in Figure 1.  
 
2.2. Side Channel Attacks 
Kocher introduced the use of side channels to break a cryptosystem [1], [2]. Attacks involving 
passive observation of external characteristics of a device are termed eavesdropping attacks, also sometimes 
called side-channel attacks. When a cryptographic device perform encryption or decryption, secret 
parameters correlated to the intermediate data being processed can be leaked via operating times, power 
dissipation, or electromagnetic radiation as side channel information. Cryptanalysis based on side channel 
information is called side-channel attack. Figure 2 shows the scenario of side channel attack. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Scenario for Side Channel Attack. 
 
 
Power analysis attacks [2] exploit the dependence between the instantaneous power consumption of 
a cryptographic device and the data it processes and/or the operation it performs. The overall power 
consumption of a cryptographic device can be divided into a static and dynamic part. Since the dynamic 
power consumption is connected directly with the processed data, it is a potential target to detect the 
dependency between these two parameters. For that reason, power traces can be used to obtain secret 
information. There are mainly two attacks using this approach, the simple power analysis and the differential 
power analysis. In a simple power-analysis, the attacker uses detailed knowledge of the device to identify 
which instructions are being executed based on their power signatures. In a differential power analysis, the 
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attacker uses a hypothetical model of the device, and refines this model with statistical analysis of the power 
usage of the device as shown in the Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Differential Power Analysis Attack. 
 
 
Electromagnetic analysis [3] exploits information that leaks through the electromagnetic field that is 
produced by a device. EM emanation can also exploit local information and, although more noisy, the 
measurements can be performed from a distance. There are 2 types of emanations: intentional and 
unintentional. The first type results from direct current flows. The second type is caused by various 
couplings, modulations etc. 
Timing attack is the type of side-channel attack involves the time taken to complete critical 
operations. Kocher [1] provides a detailed attack strategy for timing crypto-analysis of several commonly 
used algorithms. He notes that by measuring the time taken to perform private key operations, attackers can 
recover the input to those operations, thereby determining the private key. Figure 4 present the timing attack 
principle. 
Implementations of cryptographic algorithms often perform computations in non-constant time, due 
to performance optimizations. If such operations involve secret parameters, these timing variations can leak 
some information and, provided enough knowledge of the implementation is at hand, a careful statistical 
analysis could even lead to the total recovery of these secret parameters. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 4. The Timing Attack Principle. 
 
 
2.3. Advanced Encryption Standard 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was announced by Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen under 
FIPS 197 by the NIST [4]. Today AES is widely deployed in both software and hardware and is expected to 
be the world's predominant block cipher over the coming years. AES is an iterated block cipher, which uses a 
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fixed block size of 128 bits and a key which is 128, 192 or 256 bits in length. Different transformations 
operate on the intermediate results, called states. After an initial round key addition, the state array is 
transformed by implementing a round function10, 12, or 14 times depending on the key length. Each round 
except the last consists of four stages: SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns and AddRoundKey. Two of these 
stages involve transformations over Galois Field (GF - 2
8
). Generally in software implementations, the 
multiplicative inverse over GF (2
8
) is pre-computed and stored in memory in a table named SBOX. In order 
to speed up execution of the cipher, software implementations may further combine the SubBytes and 
ShiftRows with MixColumns, transforming them into a sequence of table lookups. These tables store pre-
computed values avoiding time consuming computations. AES algorithm of key length 128/192/256 was well 
developed in FPGA [5] and throughput and area comparison is done in hardware implementation [6]. During 
the AES selection process, it was believed that timing attacks were only applicable to software with a data 
dependent execution path (i.e., branch statements, data dependent shifts, etc.). In the final evaluation of AES 
candidates, NIST stated that table lookup operations are not vulnerable to timing attacks’ and declared 
Rijndael as capable of averting side-channel attacks. Despite the previous optimistic claims by the NIST, 
recent research has proven some implementations of AES to be vulnerable to several forms of side channel 
attacks [7]. 
 
2.4. Bernstein’s Timing Attack 
Two servers are used to implement Bernstein’s Timing Attack. The progression of implementation: 
Clients send packets to servers for encryption, server add time stamp to the packet, encrypts using  server’s 
key, another time stamp is added, ciphertext and  the time for encrypting the packets are recorded. The 
original packet and the two time stamps is padded with ciphertext is sent back to the client. The number of 
cycles that have been taken by the encryption process is calculated using the two time stamp values. Only the 
packets that have consumed more than 10,000 cycles are considered for the attack to reduce the effect of 
noise. For each plaintext byte, the average number of cycles, deviation and the estimated deviation for the 
encryption is calculated. After collecting sufficient amount of timing data for both the known key and the 
unknown key, a set of key possibilities for each key byte is identified by comparing the two sets of timing 
data. Finally a packet having all zeros is encrypted with the different key combinations from the set of 
identified key possibilities. By comparing the resulting cipher text and the ciphertext received of the server, 
the key combination that would encrypt the zeros in the same way as done by the server is identified as the 
secret key. 
 
 
3. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
 
3.1. Proposed Countermeasures for Bernstein’s Attack 
Countermeasures for Bernstein’s attack [8] would be Eliminating T tables, Masking timing data 
from the cache, using smaller tables for calculations, adding random delay in execution of algorithm, placing 
lookup tables in registerfile, performing encryption using hardware and OS support for partitioning locking 
and disabling cache. These countermeasures are implemented in our experimental test bed [9] and the 
performance of the countermeasures is evaluated. Adding random delay would evolve as best 
countermeasure to Bernstein’s timing attack. Figure 5 shows the performance of countermeasures. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Performance of Countermeasures 
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3.2. Proposed Key Recovery Algorithm for Timing Attack Based on Hamming Weight 
To implement timing attack, a large number of timing measurements is required.  In this method we 
find that timing attack which could reveal hamming weight of the key. The estimation of the hamming 
weight of key can be achieved with two conditions i) accurate timing measurements can be obtained ii) the 
time variation by keys with one more or one less set bit is large compared to the variations in the encryption 
and key schedule generation time produced by different keys with identical hamming weight. The estimation 
of hamming weight of the key can be done if timing measurements of several encryptions of the same 
plaintext is obtained. Random plaintext is given as a input. Same plaintext is encrypted for 1000 times using 
64 bit key and stores all ciphertext with the corresponding time taken to encrypt. The method collects the 
plaintext, ciphertexts with its timing measurements. The input message is not fixed, we choose message 
randomly at start of each encryption. We build a table of average encryption time versus hamming weight of 
the key. It allows an attacker to determine the hamming weight of the key. Using all generated traces and its 
timing measurements average timing measurements are calculated with hamming weight of the key. Our 
implementation is more efficient in revealing the cryptographic key than compared to brute force key search. 
The pseudocode described below in Figure 6 shows the key recovery method based on timing attack using 
hamming weight of the key. 
 
 
Input: 
M: set of 64-bit plaintexts, 
C: set of 64-bit ciphertexts, 
t is time it takes AES to generated ciphertext C from Message M 
Pseudocode: 
for i=0 to 64 
Let l be such that |{ j : |Tj-t| < |Tl-t|}| = i
3 
Let kl = { K ε {0,1}
64 : wt(K) = l} 
Choose random m in {0,….,|Kl| - 1} 
For j=0 to |Kl| - 1 
Let K be the (m+j) mod |Kl| 
If (AES encryption of M under key K yields C) 
then return (K) 
 
 
Figure 6. Key recovery method based on timing attack using hamming weight of the key 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION  
We study the implementation Bernstein’s Timing Attack against AES cryptosystem and timing 
attack based on hamming weight. The countermeasures against Bernstein’s Timing Attack are presented and 
the performance of the countermeasures is compared. Adding random delay would evolve as best 
countermeasure to Bernstein’s timing attack. The proposed key recovery method in this paper can recover the 
key more efficiently using the hamming weight. 
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